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The Judith Miller Case and the 
Relationship between Reporter and 
Source: Competing Visions of the 
Media’s Role and Function 
Daniel Joyce∗ 
“Confidential sources are the life’s blood of journalism.  
Without them, whether they are in government, large or small 
companies, or in non-profit organizations, people like me would be 
out of business.  As I painfully learned while covering intelligence 
estimates of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, we 
are only as good as our sources.  If they are wrong, we will be 
wrong.  And a source’s confidence that we will not divulge their 
identity is crucial to his or her readiness to come to us with 
allegations of fraud or abuse or other wrongdoing, or even a 
dissenting view about government policy or business practices that 
the American public may need to know.”1 
–Judith Miller, during testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
 
 
 
 
∗ Ph.D. Candidate, Trinity College, Cambridge.  This essay was written while a 
Visiting Research Fellow at Columbia Law School in 2005–06.  I would like to thank 
Professor Richard N. Winfield especially for his encouragement and support of this 
research.  Thanks are also due to Professor Susan Marks, Professor Monroe Price, 
Professor Michael Doyle and the Center on Global Legal Problems.  This research and 
my year at Columbia was generously supported by the Hollond Fund, Trinity College, 
Cambridge. 
 1 Judith Miller, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate, 
Oct. 19, 2005, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1637&wit_ 
id=4698 (last visited on Jan. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Miller Testimony]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the prize-winning yet controversial New York Times 
reporter Judith Miller spent eighty-five days in prison.2  She 
claimed to do this for a principle: that a reporter should not reveal 
the identity of an anonymous source.  It is argued that doing so 
would endanger the media and their sources, and also jeopardize 
their ability to gather news and critical information for the public 
and to expose wrong-doing and corruption.3  On March 6, 2007, 
I. Lewis Libby, the former chief of staff to Vice President Dick 
Cheney, was convicted of obstruction of justice, making false 
 
 2 William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 639 (2006). 
 3 See id. at 638 (quoting Miller as saying before the Court that “‘[i]f journalists cannot 
be trusted to guarantee confidentiality, then journalists cannot function and there cannot 
be a free press.’”). 
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statements to the F.B.I. and two counts of perjury.4  These charges 
arose out of Miller and the federal grand jury investigation into the 
leaking of the identity of a CIA operative Valerie Wilson (also 
known as Plame) to the press.5 
The controversy and mystery the case generated have focused 
attention on the wider social role of the media.6  This in turn 
highlights the law’s complex relationship in both defending and 
articulating the role of the media in democracy and also in 
potentially subverting this role in the interests of the administration 
of justice.7  This case and the issue of the protection of journalistic 
sources are significant then in the ongoing development of 
competing visions of the media in American life.8  This essay 
looks at the Judith Miller case, but does so to highlight the issues 
underlying the role of the media and its relationship with the 
courts.  Post-Watergate, different visions of the media have 
crystallized—one, a heroic vision of the journalist as muckraker 
and watchdog, the other, of the media as an increasingly powerful 
force in American life–complicit in corruption and governmental 
power, rather than a useful check on such power.9  The Judith 
Miller example is significant for the way in which it highlights the 
tensions that exist between our desire for a heroic media and our 
increasing fear of media power.10  Who is to watch the watchdog?  
 
4 Neil A. Lewis, Libby, Ex-Cheney Aide, Guilty of Lying in C.I.A. Leak Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1. 
 5 United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 6 See Laura Durity, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”: The Need to Protect 
Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0011 
(2006), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2006dltr0011.html 
(discussing the response to Miller by Congress in pushing legislation forward to protect 
the reporter’s privilege); see also infra text accompanying notes 204, 205. 
 7 See id.; see also text accompanying notes 204, 205. 
 8 See id.; see also text accompanying notes 204, 205. 
 9 Recent Case: Evidence—Journalist Privilege—District of Columbia Circuit Holds 
That Privacy Act Suit Satisfies Two-Prong Test to Overcome Journalist Privilege to 
Conceal Confidential Source—Lee v. Department of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 
2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1930 (2006); see infra text accompanying notes 52, 53. 
 10 See Lee, supra note 2 (discussing the impact of the Miller controversy on the 
reporter’s privilege and the public’s view of the media); see infra text accompanying 
notes 52, 53. 
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And just who are the watchdogs in an age of media de-
professionalization, citizen media and blogging?11 
This essay considers the issues arising from the Judith Miller 
controversy in the context of federal United States law concerning 
the protection of journalistic sources, what is termed the reporter’s 
privilege.12  It does so against a comparative backdrop of 
developments in the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
in Strasbourg and in the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in The Hague.  This is done to 
highlight the different ways in which the protection of journalistic 
sources has been approached at the domestic and international 
levels. 
In the Miller example, much has hung on the fact that the 
relationship between reporter and source has been one not only of 
confidence and trust, but also of secrecy.13  In the Goodwin case at 
the ECtHR, which this article considers, the identity of the source 
was also initially undisclosed.14  There, however, the context was 
one of a commercial whistle blower, involving arguments not only 
for the protection of the source, but also for the legal protection of 
confidential commercial information.  The Randal case before the 
ICTY,15 with which this article concludes, concerns the disclosure 
of a source by the Washington Post.16  This case does not concern 
the issue of whether a journalist can be forced to reveal the identity 
of a source, but rather presents the issue of whether a journalist, 
after the event, should be forced to testify in the prosecution of his 
source for crimes under international criminal law.17  Here the 
 
 11 Stephanie J. Frazee, Note, Bloggers as Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First 
Amendment Protections in a New Age of Information Dissemination, 3 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 609, 623 (2006) (discussing who is protected by the reporter’s privilege); see 
Durity, supra note 6 (discussing who qualifies as a journalist). 
 12 See Durity, supra note 6. 
 13 See Miller Testimony, supra note 1. 
 14 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, available at 
http://worldii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/16.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 157–184. 
 15 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Case No. IT-99-36-AR3.9, 
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, (Dec. 11, 2002). 
 16 See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 188–203. 
 17 See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 188–203 (discussing underlying 
issues of the Randal case). 
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sensitivity derived from the relationship between reporter and 
source necessary for effective news-gathering, not merely the 
confidentiality of the source’s identity.18  By focusing on the Judith 
Miller case, this essay examines, against a comparative 
background, our conflicting desires for the media at an historical 
moment when the fear of media power and lack of accountability 
challenge our heroic vision of the press. 
I. THE FACTS OF THE MILLER CASE: AN EMERGING STORY 
The facts of the Miller case are confusing and to some degree 
contested.  Many details have only recently emerged, and continue 
to do so as this article goes to press against the background of the 
ongoing Libby trial.19  In early 2002, former ambassador Joseph 
Wilson traveled to Niger for the CIA to investigate the claim that 
Iraq had purchased uranium from the African country.20  This trip 
occurred in the context of fears of the development of weapons of 
mass destruction (“WMD”) by Iraq, and the threat this posed.21  In 
March 2003, a US led coalition invaded Iraq.22  Arguments 
concerning WMD formed a backdrop to the invasion and this led 
to media interest in the validity of such claims.23  On July 6, 2003, 
Wilson wrote an op-ed for the New York Times in which he 
contradicted government claims about Iraq’s purchase of uranium 
from an African country.24  This led to government clarification 
that the Niger story had been misleading.25 
On July 14, 2003, commentator Robert Novak revealed in his 
column that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA operative, 
 
 18 See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 188–203. 
 19 See NPR.org, Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=4764919 (last visited Jan. 11, 2007); NYTimes.com, Timeline of a 
Leak, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/washington/2006_LEAKTIMELINE_GRAPHIC.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2007). 
 20 See Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19; see also Timeline of a Leak, supra 
note 19 (discussing Wilson’s travel to Niger). 
 21 See Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19. 
 22 See id. 
 23 See, e.g., id. (discussing media interests). 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. (discussing further clarifications by the government). 
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information only recently revealed to have been originally sourced 
from former deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (Novak’s 
other sources were also recently revealed as being Karl Rove and 
Bill Harlow), who is also said to have revealed her identity to Bob 
Woodward.26  Shortly after, on July 17, an online Time article by 
Matthew Cooper, Massimo Calabresi and John Dickerson also 
indicated that government officials had revealed to them the 
identity of Plame in the context of the Wilson/Niger controversy.27  
This led to speculation about the White House leaking the 
information to damage Wilson, and that senior presidential advisor 
Karl Rove may have been involved in the leaking of this 
information.28  On September 28, the CIA called for an 
investigation into the leak and two days later the Justice 
Department launched a criminal investigation.29  Revealing the 
identity of a CIA operative in certain contexts can form the basis 
for a federal offense.30 
On December 30, 2003, the Justice Department appointed 
Patrick Fitzgerald as special counsel and a grand jury investigation 
continued involving administration officials and the press.31  The 
investigation went as high as the President who was questioned in 
private by a team of federal prosecutors.32  On August 9, 2004, 
U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Hogan held Cooper in contempt 
of court for refusing to reveal his confidential source’s identity to 
the grand jury and ordered him to jail.33  Cooper subsequently 
avoided jail and agreed to questioning by prosecutors.34  On 
 
 26 Neil A. Lewis, First Source of C.I.A. Leak Admits Role, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 2006; Eric Lichtblau, Journalists said to Figure in Strategy in Leak Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005; Jim VandeHei and Carol D. Leonnig, Woodward Was Told of 
Plame More Than Two Years Ago, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2005. 
 27 Matthew Cooper, Massimo Calebresi & John F. Dickerson, A War On Wilson?, 
TIME, July 17, 2003, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,465270,00.html? 
internalid=ACA. 
 28 Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id.; see also, Richard W. Stevenson & Eric Lichtblau, The Struggle for Iraq: 
Intelligence; President Orders Full Cooperation in Leaking of Name, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2003, at A6. 
 31 Timeline of a Leak, supra note 19. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. The order was stayed pending an appeal. Id. 
 34 Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19. 
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August 12, Judith Miller was subpoenaed to appear before the 
grand jury and on October 7 she was held in contempt for refusing 
to name her confidential sources, with the order sending her to jail 
again stayed pending her appeal.35  Several days later, on 
October 13, Cooper was again held in contempt for refusing to 
name his confidential source.36  On June 27, 2005, the U.S. 
Supreme Court declined to review the appeals of Cooper and 
Miller,37 and several days later Time agreed to hand over their 
reporter Cooper’s notes and emails to prosecutors.38  On July 6, 
2005, Miller was jailed and Cooper agreed to cooperate claiming 
that his confidential source (later revealed as Karl Rove) had 
waived their agreement and that consequently he had been released 
from his obligation to protect the source’s identity.39 
The investigation continued, as did speculation concerning the 
role and motives of Rove, Cheney and others.40  Cooper eventually 
revealed that he had spoken to Rove and learned certain details 
about Plame’s work for the CIA.  Speculation and confusion also 
continued about Novak’s role and the identity of his sources until 
the recent revelation that Armitage was the original leaker.41  
Judith Miller was released from jail on September 29, 2005, having 
secured an uncoerced waiver from her source.42  The next day she 
gave evidence to the grand jury and the New York Times identified 
her source as being Lewis Libby, Chief of Staff to the Vice 
President.43  Rove gave further evidence and Miller initially 
claimed Libby did not name Plame although he did discuss her 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Miller v. United States, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); Cooper v. United 
States, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). 
 38 Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See generally Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19; see also Timeline of a 
Leak, supra note 19. 
 41 See also Robert Novak, My Role in the Plame Leak Probe, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 12, 
2006, at 14; David Johnston, Novak Told Prosecutor His Sources in Leak Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 2006, A16; Rupert Cornwell, Bush Officials Cleared as Powell’s Former 
Deputy Admits Unmasking CIA Agent, INDEP. (London), Sept. 9, 2006, at 36. 
 42 Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19. 
 43 Timeline of a Leak, supra note 19. 
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CIA work.44 Consequently, there is confusion over the naming of 
Plame/Wilson in Miller’s notebook, and in her testimony in 
Libby’s trial she appears to be saying now that Libby did name 
Plame/Wilson in their conversations.45  Cooper also has testified 
that Rove first talked to him about Wilson and that this was 
confirmed by Libby in a subsequent conversation. 
On October 28, 2005, Libby was indicted on charges relating to 
obstruction of justice, perjury and the making of a false 
statement.46  He has resigned and was convicted in 2007 on four of 
five charges.47  At present, the investigation looks to have run its 
course, but questions have been raised about its conduct following 
the revelation that Armitage (along subsequently with Rove and 
Harlow) was the original source for Novak, and that Fitzgerald 
knew of this from the beginning.48  Some have argued that this 
damages theories about Rove and a high level government initiated 
smear campaign against the Wilsons.49  With Rove being advised 
on June 13, 2006 that he will not be charged, some of the mystery 
over the investigation is beginning to abate.50  Controversy of 
course remains, especially with a suit filed by the Wilsons against 
Cheney, Libby and Rove.51  As this article goes to press, Libby’s 
trial has finished, triggering renewed media attention, promising 
new revelations and increased attention to the issues with which 
this article is concerned.  Libby’s defense appears to be that he has 
been scapegoated by the administration in an effort to protect Karl 
Rove and others. 
The Miller example, in particular, is an unfortunate test case 
for the journalistic privilege because the context of the relationship 
between Miller and her source does not fit neatly into the heroic 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id; see also Neil A Lewis & Scott Shane, Reporter Who Was Jailed Testifies in Libby 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007. 
 46 Timeline of a Leak, supra note 19. 
 47 Libby, Guilty of Lying, supra note 4. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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paradigm typically asserted in defense of the privilege.52  Yet, 
while an exceptional case, it will arguably continue to shape the 
wider debate over the protection of sources and the now 
contentious role for the media in democratic politics.  Miller 
herself has come under attack from a wide range of parties and 
interest groups.53  Since her release from jail, Miller has been the 
subject of criticism from her own newspaper, leading to her 
resignation from the New York Times. 
It has been hard to determine whether Miller has indeed been a 
watchdog or a lap dog in this process, and the case has also 
sparked wider political controversy flowing from her role in 
articulating the government’s case for the war in Iraq in a number 
of prominent articles in the New York Times.54  To this degree, part 
of the debate also concerns the responsibilities and role of the 
Times as “the paper of record” in the United States.55  In this 
context, and in the present controversy, some have questioned her 
close relationship with government officials, and criticized the 
style of “access” journalism which she (and others such as 
Woodward in recent times) has practiced.  From this perspective it 
can be seen that the treatment of Miller has reflected a trend 
towards public skepticism regarding the mass media and its power 
in American political life.56  There has been comparatively little 
public protest at her jailing, though of course there has been 
intense media interest and speculation.57  Another dimension has 
been the issue of corporate ownership of the media and the 
 
 52 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Journalist Privilege and Law Enforcement Leaks, 
available at http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/11/journalist_priv_1.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2007) (arguing that the journalist privilege should apply when the 
leak is in the public interest, which does not apply to the Valerie Plame leak). 
 53 See, e.g., Dan Froomkin, Miller’s Big Secret, WASH. POST, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2005/09/30/BL2005093000669.html (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2007). 
 54 See generally Michael Massing, Now They Tell Us?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, vol. 51, 
no. 3, Feb. 26, 2004. 
 55 See generally HOWARD FRIEL & RICHARD FALK, THE RECORD OF THE PAPER: HOW 
THE NEW YORK TIMES MISREPORTS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Verso 2004). 
 56 See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION 
POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (New Press 2000). 
 57 See Nicholas Lemann, The Wayward Press: Telling Secrets: How a Leak Became a 
Scandal, NEW YORKER, Nov. 7, 2005, at 48. 
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perception that this may lessen media companies’ advocacy for 
their journalists.58  It is important then to see the broader historical 
and political context within which the arguments for the protection 
of sources occur.  The position of the journalist as an actor in 
American life is also part of the story, along with the wider 
institutional role of the media. 
II. JOURNALISTS AND THEIR SOURCES: THE NATURE OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP AND WHAT IS BEING PROTECTED 
When considering the legal status of the reporter’s privilege in 
U.S. law, it must first be noted that the Miller case and the position 
in U.S. federal law as discussed in this essay is the exception rather 
than the rule.  First, this is due to the fact that the Miller case 
concerns the question of whether the privilege is available in a 
grand jury criminal law context (the end of the spectrum for the 
privilege most likely to conflict with the concern for due process 
and the efficient and effective operation of criminal law 
proceedings before the courts).59  Second, the setting for Miller and 
Cooper’s requested testimony is in a federal law context where 
exceptionally there is no federal shield legislation to consider as of 
yet.60  This is in contrast to the great majority of states of the 
Union and the District of Columbia where such legislation exists in 
varying forms.61  However, free speech advocates such as Judith 
Miller’s lawyer Floyd Abrams warn of complacency, and 
characterize the situation regarding the reporter’s privilege as bleak 
 
 58 See Editorial, Who Has Your Back? Journalism in the Corporate Age, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 7. 
 59 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 60 The U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee has held a number of hearings regarding this 
issue and the reporter’s privilege.  See, e.g., Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Issues and 
Implications: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), available 
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1579 (last visited Nov. 14, 2006); see also 
Free Flow of Information Bill, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3323.IH: (last visited Nov. 14, 2006); 
Free Flow of Information Bill, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.1419: (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
 61 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Tatel, J., concurring). 
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especially in contrast to the more protective European 
jurisprudence as typified by the Goodwin case.62  Abrams writes: 
While forty-nine of the fifty states have provided total or 
partial protection for confidential sources, and many federal 
courts have done so as well, a number of courts in recent 
years have provided little or no protection at all.  Worse 
yet, a spate of “leak investigations,” in which journalists 
have been targeted to reveal the identities [of confidential 
sources] . . . have posed increasing threats to the ability of 
the press to do its job.63 
Generally, what is sought to be protected by the media is the 
identity of confidential sources relied upon by journalists in their 
news-gathering and reporting, especially where without such an 
offer of confidentiality, the source, typically a whistleblower or 
insider, would be unable or unwilling to give valuable information 
to the reporter.64  What is at issue then is the ability of journalists 
to perform their work in the central, but difficult, genres of 
political reportage, news, and investigative reporting.65  What is at 
stake is the freedom of the press as configured in a constitutional 
context, but also the right of the public to receive information as it 
relates to core political speech and political communication.66 
In a society where deliberation lies at the heart of democratic 
theory and where speech is strongly protected by the Constitution, 
the idea of the reporter’s privilege is a significant one.  The 
protection sought varies according to context.  The privilege is 
more likely to be recognized in civil rather than criminal contexts, 
and also where the source to be protected is confidential rather 
than non-confidential, although as we shall see this is not always 
the case in an international criminal law context.67  A journalist’s 
 
 62 See FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY: TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Viking 
2005). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972). 
 65 See generally Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The 
Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201 
(2005). 
 66 Id. 
 67 See discussion infra The International Criminal Law Dimension: The Randal Case. 
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argument for resisting giving evidence will be strongest where they 
are seen to be a non-party to proceedings and where there are other 
means for the courts to gather such information.68  Generally, 
journalists are seen as citizens and no different from others, when 
they directly eyewitness events and are thus expected to give 
evidence in such a context.69  In fact, in the Miller case the 
prosecutor argued this eyewitness exception in relation to the 
journalists, as the crime alleged might be committed directly 
through disclosure by the source to the journalist.  In a sense then, 
Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald earlier argued from a rationale that 
the journalists involved should testify due to their proximity not 
only to the evidence sought, but more so to the commission of the 
offense being investigated.70 
It must be remembered too that Miller (unlike Matthew Cooper 
or Robert Novak) did not publish an article and thereby disclose 
sensitive information to the wider public.71  So, what is sought to 
be protected from the journalist’s perspective can be (often beyond 
even a particular story or scoop) the relationship established 
between reporter and source, and the trust and ongoing confidence 
flowing from this, both in terms of the specific relationship, say 
between Libby and Miller, and also the wider reputation of the 
media in the eyes of potential sources.72  Miller was, on her 
account, prepared to go to jail for the principle at stake even where 
no story was directly at issue.73  What was at issue was her 
credibility, the credibility of her paper, the New York Times, and 
the broader legal protection for and societal status of the media at 
large. 
 
 68 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 185 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 69 See id. 
 70 United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44 (D.D.C. 2006).  Litigation is ongoing 
in the Libby prosecution concerning his subpoenas concerning various news 
organizations and journalists.  In the opinion of Judge Walton of the District Court for the 
District of Columbia, “this Court concludes that the First Amendment does not protect a 
news reporter, or that reporter’s news organization, from producing documents pursuant 
to a Rule 17(c) subpoena in a criminal prosecution when the news reporter is personally 
involved in the activity that forms the predicate for the criminal offences charged in the 
indictment.” Id. 
 71 Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19. 
 72 See Miller Testimony, supra note 1. 
 73 Id. 
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Given the complexity of rationales and the competition 
between legal and media principles and ethics which arises, I argue 
that a useful means to approach the privilege and the cases is by 
focusing on the relationship between journalist and source.  This 
will require the courts to cede some ground in a sense to the 
concerns of the media in any given case, but this is perhaps 
appropriate given the courts final authority in any matter and to 
avoid the situation as illustrated by Judith Miller, where the courts’ 
rationales and the media’s internal culture seem irreconcilable.74  
Without legislative intervention, the troubling result is the jailing 
of increasing numbers of reporters without any great evidentiary or 
procedural outcome in terms of the administration of justice.75  If 
we accept that the media should approach more carefully their 
relationship with confidential sources, especially when such 
relationships fall outside traditional heroic understandings of the 
media as a watchdog or fourth estate, then so too must the courts, 
and perhaps more importantly zealous prosecutors, come to 
understand why journalists are prepared to suffer incarceration to 
protect their relationships with sources. 
The Miller affair then can also be seen as a clash of cultures: 
media and legal.76  From this flow assumptions within each culture 
of the position and power of each institution in a democratic 
society and also of the capacities of each in terms of truth-seeking, 
fact-finding, and the monitoring of centers of political power77 in 
any constitutional arrangement.  Beyond the dichotomy involved 
in such ‘clash of cultures’ analysis it is also necessary to see that 
there remains some confusion even within each culture as to how 
the relationship and the privilege is to be characterized. 
Some see the privilege as belonging to the source and deriving 
from the relationship of confidence, such that it might be waived at 
a later point.  Even here, as illustrated by the Miller case, there are 
differing opinions as to what might constitute such a waiver, for 
 
 74 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 986 (Tatel, J., 
concurring). 
 75 Nestler, supra note 65, at 243–46. 
 76 Id. at 247–48. 
 77 For a discussion of this as the function of journalism, see ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT 
WAR FOR CIVILIZATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Knopf 2005). 
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Miller has argued that she waited for a full and uncoerced waiver 
from Libby before agreeing to testify.78  Media lawyers have 
tended to say that the privilege belongs to the media and thus it is 
for the reporter to waive. This underscores the personal nature of 
the relationship under scrutiny and helps to explain the differences 
of opinion that result even within the media itself.  As Miller 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, there needs to be a 
resolution of the issue of waiver, with the present system designed 
for stalemate: 
Yes, the legal machinations in my case were enormously 
complex, but the principle I was defending was fairly 
straightforward: once reporters give a pledge to keep a 
source’s identity confidential, they must be willing to honor 
that pledge and not testify unless the source gives explicit, 
personal permission for them to do so, and they are able—
toi [sic] protect other confidential sources. 
Eventually, when the fuss over my case dies down, I hope 
journalists and politicians will begin examining the real 
issues at stake here, especially the question of when and 
under what circumstances a waiver can be considered 
voluntary. Struggling with such a weighty question alone in 
jail was hardly ideal. I did the best I could under rather 
challenging circumstances.79 
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH:  
JUDITH MILLER AND BEYOND 
From the outset it should be noted that the privilege derives 
from a number of sources, depending on the specific setting for its 
claim: the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, state 
constitutional provisions, the various state shield statutes and also 
arguably from the common law which recognizes a set of 
traditional privileges.80  For the purposes of this essay, I shall focus 
on the law as it applies to the exceptional case of Judith Miller at 
 
 78 Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19. 
 79 Miller Testimony, supra note 1. 
 80 See Lee, supra note 2, at 683–84. 
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the federal level, focusing in particular on the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
The Branzburg case81 is the leading, if somewhat ambiguous, 
authority in the US on the reporter’s privilege in the case of a 
grand jury.  The 1972 Supreme Court case, and in particular the 
judgment of Justice Powell, has been variously interpreted by 
federal courts as both opening up the possibility for a common law 
privilege, and as excluding it in the grand jury context.82 
The case of Branzburg arose from three appeals involving 
reporter testimony before grand juries in a criminal law context, 
one federal, another from Massachusetts where no shield laws 
applied, and the other from Kentucky where the relevant shield law 
was inapplicable.83  The reporter, Branzburg, was involved in two 
cases from Kentucky where he had observed and written about 
marijuana use.  The Massachusetts case involved newsgathering in 
relation to the Black Panthers, and the federal case involved a New 
York Times reporter also covering the Black Panthers and other 
militant groups.84  All refused to testify before grand juries.  
Justice White delivered the majority opinion, in which the court, 
with the ambiguous support of Justice Powell, refused to recognize 
an absolute or qualified privilege for reporters from testifying 
before grand juries in relation to their confidential sources, where 
no shield law applies.85 
As Justice White noted “[t]he heart of the claim is that the 
burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to 
disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in 
obtaining the information.”86  While recognizing the importance of 
confidential sources in journalistic practice, Justice White argued 
with the majority that reporters could not be distinguished from 
other citizens when it came to their duty to give evidence when 
subpoenaed before grand juries in relation to criminal 
 
 81 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 82 See Nestler, supra note 65, at 220–25. 
 83 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665. 
 84 Id. at 667–79. 
 85 For Justice White’s majority opinion, see id. at 667–709.  For Justice Powell’s 
concurrence, see id. at 709–10. 
 86 408 U.S. at 681. 
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investigations.87  Justice White noted that the right of a reporter to 
gather information is not unrestrained.88  He wrote: 
A number of States have provided newsmen a statutory 
privilege of varying breadth, but the majority have not done 
so, and none has been provided by federal statute.  Until 
now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses 
that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.  
We are asked to create another by interpreting the First 
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that 
other citizens do not enjoy.  This we decline to do.89 
The majority considered appearance in such a context  to be a 
citizen’s duty.  Ultimately, the majority held there to be no danger 
for reporter or source except where either were implicated in 
criminal activity themselves, and hence undeserving of protection.  
Justice White insisted too that this involved no prior restraint, and 
that the Court could not condone the “theory that it is better to 
write about crime than to do something about it.”90  Justice White 
considered the argument about the negative consequences that 
might result for the flow of news and information, but without 
clear evidence for this he regarded much of this line of reasoning 
as “speculative.”91  The majority noted that “the privilege claimed 
is that of the reporter,”92 but concluded that “[f]rom the beginning 
of our country the press has operated without constitutional 
protection for press informants, and the press has flourished.”93  
The majority also seemed to indicate that while a qualified 
privilege was being sought in this case, at essence, the question of 
resolving competing legal and media values was all or nothing.  
“For them, it would appear that only an absolute privilege would 
 
 87 Id. at 682–91. 
 88 Id. at 689–90. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692. 
 91 Id. at 693–94. 
 92 Id. at 695. 
 93 Id. at 698–99. 
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suffice.”94  It is this failure to reconcile and compromise that has 
seen the tension over this issue grow with time. 
As in other cases, and with the issue of a federal shield law, the 
practical issue of how to define a journalist, and whether this 
would let “the lonely pamphleteer”95 or the blogger of the present 
day, claim such a privilege, weighed against its recognition.96  The 
argument being that without a system of licensing, odious to the 
media and likely ineffective, anyone could claim to be a 
journalist.97  This is an issue with particular poignancy in the 
present era with the de-professionalization of journalism, the rise 
of the celebrity blogger and the turn to citizen media.98  Justice 
White also appeared to be arguing that the press were powerful 
enough without such protection, and further that where testimony 
was sought, it would be done under the careful supervision of the 
courts.99 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion has been considered 
ambiguous as he felt the need to “emphasize . . .  the limited nature 
of the Court’s holding.”100  In essence he argued that there was 
constitutional protection for reporters who could argue the merits 
on a case by case basis such that a balance between “freedom of 
the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant 
testimony with respect to criminal conduct” is achieved.101  It 
would be possible for journalists to resist such subpoenas and for 
accommodation by means such as protective orders to be achieved.  
Justice Stewart’s powerful dissent was also referred to by Justice 
 
 94 Id. at 702. 
 95 Id. at 704. 
 96 See also Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism 
to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1371 (2003). 
 97 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Testimony on a Proposed Journalist-Source Privilege to the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, University of Chicago Law School Occasional Paper 
Number 46, at 11, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/occasional-papers/ 
stone-46.pdf (2005). 
 98 See, e.g., DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE, 
FOR THE PEOPLE (O’Reilly Media 2004). 
 99 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706–07. 
 100 Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 101 Id. at 710. 
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Powell,102 especially where Stewart had written of the danger of 
the state’s annexation of “the journalistic profession as an 
investigative arm of government.”103  And Stewart himself wrote 
that “Justice Powell’s enigmatic concurring opinion gives some 
hope of a more flexible view in the future . . .”104 
Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) 
wrote powerfully of the dangers confronting the freedom of the 
press and their ability to function, but also to the administration of 
justice, if the flow of information was impeded, and in doing so he 
recognized the significance of the news-gathering process.105  He 
wrote: “[t]he right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a 
confidential relationship between a reporter and his source.”106  In 
doing so he focused on the relationship between reporter and 
source as being critical, something later picked up by both 
European and international criminal jurisprudence as subsequently 
noted.107  The focus was not on the motives of the source, but on 
the relationship in the context of the flow of information and the 
media’s constitutional role in this dimension.108  Justice Stewart 
also argued, as have others, that the majority’s position would lead 
to self-censorship and send the wrong signal to future 
whistleblowers.109  The conflicting need for evidence before grand 
juries was not absolute as illustrated by other common law 
evidentiary privileges and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.110  
Rather what would be lost would be the free and open debate 
necessary to democracy and decision-making and recognized in 
cases such as the 1964 landmark U.S. Supreme Court First 
Amendment decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.111  
Justice Stewart indicated that a qualified privilege would be better 
suited than the majority’s apparent refusal, and proposed a three-
 
 102 Id. at 709. 
 103 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 726–28. 
 106 Id. at 728. 
 107 Id. at 729–30. 
 108 Id. at 726 n.1, 730. 
 109 Id. at 731. 
 110 Id. at 737. 
 111 Id. at 738; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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point alternative formulation which has been adopted in 
subsequent cases in lower courts which have recognized the 
privilege.  The government must: 
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the 
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a 
specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the 
information sought cannot be obtained by alternate means 
less destructive of First Amendment rights; and 
(3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the 
information.112 
As discussed earlier, the legacy of Branzburg has been 
controversial with a divergence at the federal appellate court level 
in terms of how the decision has been interpreted in the context of 
the reporter’s privilege.113  The Supreme Court denied Miller and 
Cooper’s petition for writ of certiorari,114 and consequently in 
terms of the Miller case, the final appellate interpretation remains 
at the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  It 
seems clear that despite the need for the Supreme Court to revisit 
this case or for federal legislation to remedy its troubling 
outcomes, that the majority position in Branzburg refusing to 
recognize a reporter’s privilege in the context of criminal grand 
jury investigations remains the law.115 
This was certainly the position taken by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Miller.116  Because 
of the similarity of Miller to the Branzburg facts, Judge Tatel 
 
 112 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743. 
 113 For recent decision flatly rejecting the privilege in criminal cases, see United States 
v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).  For decisions recognizing various degrees of 
qualified privilege, in addition to those discussed in this article, see, for example, Price v. 
Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st 
Cir. 2004); Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 114 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g 
denied, 405 F.3d 17 (2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). 
 115 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–670 (1991) (harmonizing 
Branzburg with a “well-established line of decisions” holding that the press has no 
special immunity from the application of general laws); Miller, 397 F.3d at 970 (“The 
Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question.  Without doubt, that is the end 
of the matter.”). 
 116 Miller, 397 F.3d 964. 
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concurred in the majority decision, while indicating that there 
might be some scope for future elaboration of the reporter’s 
privilege from a common law foundation.117  Tatel further 
recognized the tension underlying Miller and the unsatisfactory 
nature of the law at present, recognizing from the beginning that, 
“[t]his case involves a clash between two truth-seeking institutions: 
the grand jury and the press.”118  Tatel was also prepared to find 
Branzburg “more ambiguous than do my colleagues.”119  He 
concurred with the majority but made it clear that the context for 
consideration of the privilege had changed since Branzburg, 
continuing: “I believe that the consensus of forty-nine states plus 
the District of Columbia—and even the Department of Justice—
would require us to protect reporters’ sources as a matter of federal 
common law were the leak at issue either less harmful or more 
newsworthy.”120 
Judge Tatel’s concurring opinion in fact appears to revive the 
ambiguity with which Justice Powell’s involvement in the 
Branzburg majority has been interpreted.  Though Branzburg is 
presently settled law, Miller seems to indicate that it may be time 
for the Supreme Court to reconsider Branzburg with a future case 
whose facts are more deserving of the heroic paradigm of the 
journalist as a public watchdog, especially so outside of the context 
of criminal investigations and national security concerns.121  There 
is much in Judge Tatel’s opinion to spark future challenges as he 
stated ominously, “I am uncertain that Branzburg offers ‘no 
support’ for a constitutional reporter privilege in the grand jury 
context.”122 
However, in the subsequent case of Lee v. Dep’t of Justice,123 
which concerned a Chinese-American scientist accused of 
espionage involving the transfer of nuclear weapons information to 
 
 117 Id. at 986–87. 
 118 Id. at 986. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 986–87. 
 121 Id. at 994. 
 122 Id. at 987. 
 123 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied, 428 F.3d 299 (2005).  But see Lee, 428 
F.3d 299 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing for a public importance requirement to be 
attached to the Zerilli test). 
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China while working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the 
courts have kept to their tough approach to the recent claims of 
journalists regarding their anonymous sources.124  The Supreme 
Court has yet again denied a petition for writ of certiorari, leaving 
Branzburg intact.125  In Lee, the scientist had, having agreed to a 
plea deal for the lesser charge of mishandling classified 
information, initiated a privacy case against federal agencies, and 
sought discovery orders against reporters to determine whether 
information about him had been aggressively leaked to the press 
during the investigation by senior government officials such as the 
then Secretary of State for Energy, Bill Richardson.126 
A district court had held five journalists in contempt for 
refusing to disclose their anonymous sources to Lee.127  The Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the contempt orders 
for all appellants save for one, Jeff Gerth, where the court found 
there was insufficient evidence.128  Judge Sentelle gave the opinion 
for the Court and focused on a two-prong test for overcoming the 
privilege in such a civil action (in contrast to Miller), set out in the 
earlier case of Zerilli v. Smith.129  According to the court’s 
interpretation of this test, two conditions must be satisfied to 
determine:: 
[w]hen a plaintiff may compel a non-party journalist to 
testify to the identity of his confidential sources.  First, the 
information sought must go to “the heart of the matter” and 
not be merely marginally relevant. . . .  Second, the plaintiff 
must have exhausted “every reasonable alternative source 
of information” so that journalists are not simply a default 
source of information for plaintiffs.130 
 
 124 Lee, 413 F.3d at 64. 
 125 See Recent Case: Evidence—Journalist Privilege—District of Columbia Holds that 
Privacy Act Satisfies Two-Prong Test To Overcome Journalist Privilege to Conceal 
Confidential Sources, Lee v. Department of Justice, 413 F. 3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1930 (2006). 
 126 See Lee, 413 F.3d at 62. 
 127 Id. at 55. 
 128 Id. 
 129 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 130 Lee, 413 F.3d at 57. 
JOYCE_STAFFPROOF_032507 4/2/2007  11:58:15 AM 
576 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. XVII 
Given the exhaustive and unsuccessful discovery efforts Lee 
employed with regard to the government agencies, the District 
Court had found these elements to be satisfied.  Judge Sentelle 
emphasized that the Supreme Court in Branzburg had “flatly 
rejected the existence of any such constitutional privilege”131 with 
regard to the First Amendment, and here the court refused to enter 
into the controversy over the nature of a federal common law 
privilege.132  Having found that any such privilege would be 
qualified in any event, the court emphasized that the context for the 
source protection and the behavior of the media would be 
significant elements in any determination.  Again the court seemed 
to be saying that the privilege would have to fit a heroic paradigm 
of the media performing a watchdog role.133  This was contrasted 
with “a civil action such as this one, where testimony of journalists 
is sought because government officials have been accused of 
illegally providing the journalists with private information.”134  
Here, too Judge Sentelle emphasized that: 
this case does not involve a claim of “forbidden intrusion 
on the field of free expression.”  There is no suggestion that 
the court or any branch of government in any fashion 
attempted to interfere with or now attempts to interfere 
with the Appellant journalists’ right to print or 
communicate anything they choose.135 
In other words, these facts did not fit the classic First 
Amendment territory of a case such as New York Times v. 
Sullivan.136  Further, this reveals a narrow view of the rationale for 
the protection, neglecting to emphasize the systemic importance of 
source protection as an ongoing modus operandi for the media.137  
The court concluded that the Zerilli test had been met and deferred 
to the judgment of the lower courts.138 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 57 n.2. 
 133 See id. at 59–60. 
 134 Id. at 59. 
 135 Id. at 58. 
 136 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 137 Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 138 Id. 
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Another recent decision involving Judith Miller and the New 
York Times continues in this hardening approach towards the 
media and their anonymous sources in the courts.139  The case 
involved attempts by the United States government to subpoena 
the phone records of New York Times reporters, including Judith 
Miller.140  Such records were sought during an investigation of an 
alleged disclosure of information concerning raids and asset 
freezing in relation to organizations suspected of raising finances 
for and supporting terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11th 
attacks.141  The reporters concerned refused to cooperate with a 
grand jury investigation and the government sought the records 
from the phone companies.142 
The New York Times sought a declaratory judgment that the 
records were protected by the reporter’s privilege derived from 
both the common law and First Amendment.  The District Court 
judge at first instance granted this motion on the grounds of both a 
common law and First Amendment qualified privilege and the 
failure of the government to overcome such a privilege.  Judge 
Winter, for the majority in the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, overturned this decision on the basis of Branzburg as 
concerns the First Amendment claim, and on the facts involving 
threats to national security in relation to any common law 
privilege.  Having dismissed the First Amendment claim, Judge 
Winter would not decide whether in fact a common law privilege 
existed at all “because any such privilege would be overcome as a 
matter of law on the present facts.”143  In a strongly worded 
opinion, Judge Winter points to the fact that the evidence from the 
media is critical to the grand jury investigation, regarding 
“disclosures of upcoming asset freezes/searches and informing the 
 
 139 N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006); see also McKevitt v. 
Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003), along with the commentary on the post-
Branzburg jurisprudence in Kyu Ho Youm, International and Comparative Law on the 
Journalist’s Privilege: The Randal Case as a Lesson for the American Press, 1 J. INT’L 
MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 18–21 (2006). 
 140 N.Y. Times v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d at 162. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 163. 
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targets of them”144 and that there is a “compelling governmental 
interest in the investigation.”145  Again, the courts seem to be 
saying that to qualify for First Amendment or common law 
protection, the media’s activity has to fit the parameters of 
traditional notions of a watchdog ideal.  Context is the key to any 
protection and the vision of the role the media should be playing, 
as against the one it played here, is clear in the following passage: 
We see no danger to a free press in so holding.  Learning of 
imminent law enforcement asset freezes/searches and 
informing targets of them is not an activity essential, or 
even common, to journalism.  Where such reporting 
involves the uncovering of government corruption or 
misconduct in the use of investigative powers, courts can 
easily find appropriate means of protecting the journalists 
involved and their sources.146 
The message from the court is that the privilege is to protect 
the media from “[o]fficial harassment” but not to protect the press 
when it is linked to potential criminal activity,147 especially where 
there are national security implications.  In an important corrective 
opinion, the dissenting Judge Sack reflects on the implications of 
disclosure of telephone records for the profession of journalism, 
and disagrees with the majority’s narrow reading of Branzburg.148  
Further, the dissenting opinion joins in the approach of Judge Tatel 
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller.149  For Judge Sack 
there is “no doubt that there has been developed . . . federal 
common-law protection for journalists’ sources . . . .”150  Judge 
Sack writes of the privilege, “[i]t is palpable; it is ubiquitous; it is 
widely relied upon; it is an integral part of the way in which the 
American public is kept informed and therefore of the American 
democratic process.”151 
 
 144 Id. at 171. 
 145 Id. at 171. 
 146 Id. at 171–72. 
 147 Id. at 172; see also, In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 148 N.Y. Times v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d at 178 (Sack, J., dissenting). 
 149 See 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. 2005). 
 150 N.Y. Times v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d at 181. 
 151 Id. 
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In doing so, the dissent also makes reference to international 
practice in the protection of confidential sources and the case of 
Goodwin.152  The dissent also argues that leaks, though damaging 
in certain contexts, play an important role in combating corruption 
and in improving the functioning of government.153  In matters of 
secrecy, the government, the public and the press necessarily 
operate in “healthy adversarial tension,”154 befitting a conflict 
model of press and government relations.155  This is an important 
opinion, but in the recent cases discussed the tide appears to have 
turned against such a protective view of the legal rights of the 
media.156 
Despite the strength of protection for speech offered by the 
United States Constitution’s First Amendment and the highly 
developed protections for the media in other contexts, the confused 
approach presently taken at a Supreme Court level, and the 
toughening stance towards the protection of journalistic sources 
being taken in recent United States appellate decisions, contrasts 
with the European human rights jurisprudence which has emerged 
following consideration of the role and function of the media in 
democracy in the context of Article 10.157  I now turn to discuss 
both the European framework and the leading case of Goodwin to 
amplify this contrast. 
 
 152 Id. at 181 n.9. 
 153 Id. at 183. 
 154 Id. at 184. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See, e.g., Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 157 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Rome, 4 Nov. 1950), 312 E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45; 
Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55; Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118; and Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. 155; 
entered into force 3 Sept. 1953 (Protocol No. 3 on 21 Sept. 1970, Protocol No. 5 on 20 
Dec. 1971, Protocol No. 8 on 1 Jan. 1990, Protocol 11 on 11 Jan. 1998), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). 
JOYCE_STAFFPROOF_032507 4/2/2007  11:58:15 AM 
580 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. XVII 
IV. THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE:  
THE GOODWIN CASE 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ‘ECHR’) is presently the 
most successful and established of regional human rights 
frameworks, and provides a detailed right to freedom of expression 
in its Article 10 which has been the subject of a good deal of 
litigation and comment.  Article 10 and its interpretation is of 
increasing significance for member states of the Council of Europe 
who are required to conform with the European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence at the domestic level.  Article 10 is 
formulated as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.158 
Article 10 of the ECHR  focuses on opinion, information, ideas 
and political processes, but also envisages state regulatory and 
licensing regimes. 
A number of recent cases before the European Court in 
Strasbourg have dealt with freedom of expression and the role of 
 
 158 Id. 
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the media.159  The European case of Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom160 involved the United Kingdom’s contempt laws, and 
for our purposes offers an illustration of the court’s approach to the 
reporter’s privilege from the perspective of Article 10.161  A 
journalist received confidential and potentially damaging financial 
information from an unsolicited source relating to a major 
company’s corporate plan.162  It turned out, subsequently, that the 
file had been stolen, and a judge ordered the publishers to disclose 
information regarding the source.163  The European Court felt that 
there had been an interference with the right to freedom of 
expression, but examined whether this had been justified.164  
Following its approach in earlier cases the Court highlighted the 
centrality of the right and the particular importance of media 
safeguards such as the protection of journalistic sources in the 
context of press freedom and democracy.165  In a very strong 
statement the ECtHR emphasized the vital role of the media: 
“Without such protection . . . the vital public-watchdog role of the 
press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide 
accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.”166 
They then applied the necessity and proportionality tests from 
the landmark Sunday Times case,167 noting that the member state’s 
margin of appreciation is “circumscribed by the interest of 
democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press.”168  In 
finding that Article 10 had been violated, the Court found in this 
case that the company’s interests were outweighed by the broader 
public interest in a free press.169  Again there was a strong dissent, 
 
 159 See, e.g., Jon Gauslaa, European Court Takes Action, BELLONA, Sept. 30, 2005, 
http://www.bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/envirorights/pasko/40027. 
 160 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, available at 
http://worldii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/16.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). 
 161 See id. 
 162 Id. § 11. 
 163 Id. § 15. 
 164 See id. §§ 23, 39. 
 165 Id. § 39. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
 168 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, § 40, available at 
http://worldii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/16.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). 
 169 Id. 
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but this is a generous interpretation of the right to freedom of 
expression in the context of the media, and an illustration of the 
European Court’s protection of the media’s functional role within 
democracy as well as the special protection it deems necessary for 
journalistic sources within this arrangement. 
Though the outcome in Goodwin is more comfortable for the 
media as a profession than the recent Miller, Lee and Gonzales 
cases discussed above, the ECtHR also relies on a vision of a noble 
media as public watchdog in its reasoning.170  The vision of a 
‘worthy’ media that emerges is again one of the press as involved 
in exposing corruption rather than linked to it.171  The difference in 
part is to be found in the ECtHR’s location of the protection within 
the parameters of Article 10.172  By contrast, the recent United 
States decisions appear to minimize the First Amendment’s role 
and are ambiguous on the availability of the privilege at the 
common law.173  Further, the majority judgment in Goodwin 
makes the important point that the systemic value of anonymous 
sources and the ongoing relationships between reporters and their 
sources are what need to be protected.174  All such relationships, 
and consequently the critical news-gathering and investigative 
reporting reliant upon them, are thus put at risk from approaching 
these cases on the basis only of whether the particular ad hoc facts 
fit a heroic or corrupt vision of the media.175  As the Court 
recognizes, “[a] source may provide information of little value one 
day and of great value the next; what mattered was that the 
relationship between the journalist and the source was generating 
the kind of information which had legitimate news potential.”176 
Thus, a key difference in the jurisprudence is that the European 
Court has recognized the systemic importance of the protection of 
sources to the media and the “chilling effect” of intruding upon the 
 
 170 See id. § 39. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See supra notes 157–169 and accompanying text. 
 173 See the recent opinion of Judge Walton of the District Court for the District of 
Columbia in United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 174 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, § 37, available at 
http://worldii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/16.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). 
 175 See id. 
 176 Id. 
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relationship between reporter and source.177  The European Court 
grounded the protection of sources firmly within the sphere of 
freedom of expression, worthy of the highest ‘constitutional’ 
protection.178  In this vein the majority declares, “[p]rotection of 
journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom. . .”179 
There is also an emerging policy and soft law framework at the 
European level within which the reporter’s privilege might further 
develop, following Goodwin.  This is best illustrated by a 
ministerial recommendation within the Council of Europe on the 
right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information.180  
However, lest it be thought that Goodwin was the final chapter in 
this issue for Europe, there are ongoing tensions regarding the 
reception of the European jurisprudence in domestic systems.181  In 
2005 the European Commission won a legal battle to obtain a 
German journalist’s notes, address books, copies of hard disks and 
e-mail records, following the reporter’s Brussels-based 
investigative reporting concerning alleged corruption in the 
Commission’s statistical office.182  There was at the time concern 
that this might reveal the identity of his sources and the reporter, 
Hans Martin Tillack, indicated that he might have to seek relief 
with the ECHR.183  The difficulty in such a case is that his claim 
lay against the EU which itself is not a party to the European 
human rights court.184  Any such action would likely have to be 
mounted against Belgium, which is bound by, and a party to, the 
ECHR.  Thus, the case also highlighted issues of systemic 
 
 177 Id. § 39. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See also Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (2000) 
7, “Of the Committee of Ministers to Member States On the Right of Journalists Not to 
Disclose Their Sources of Information,” Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 
March 8, 2000, at the 701st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, principles 1–7. 
 181 See Julia Day, Brussels Reporter Loses Battle To Protect Sources, GUARDIAN, Apr. 
22, 2005, available at http://www.spinwatch.org/content/view/1049/9/. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 For a discussion of the European human rights system, see Human Rights Education 
Associates, European Human Rights System, at http://www.hrea.org/learn/guides/ 
europe.html#EU (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). 
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integration regarding European institutions, courts and tribunals, 
echoes of which can be seen in the confusion of approaches in 
contemporary appellate jurisprudence in the United States.185 
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DIMENSION:  
THE RANDAL CASE 
The approach of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia to the role of war correspondents in 
international criminal justice as witnesses,186 has some continuity 
with the European human rights jurisprudence examined above and 
in particular with the representations of the role of the media and 
concerns that this role might be threatened by an overt witnessing 
function in international trials.  The Randal decision has, however, 
been criticized for limiting protection to “war correspondents” only 
and thereby creating different standards within the profession and 
failing to apply the more universal analysis developed in human 
rights cases such as Goodwin to all journalists.187 
Journalists themselves have been divided over the issue of 
whether they should take a direct role in international criminal 
trials by giving evidence for the prosecution.  This is especially 
controversial when giving evidence may compromise their 
function or relationship with sources and future sources.  Some 
have done so voluntarily, but others see the danger of such a role 
as compromising their independence and objectivity, as hampering 
their public function via a consequent loss of trust, and even as 
leading to their being further targeted by combatants in conflict 
zones.188 
 
 185 See id. 
 186 See also Steven Powles, To Testify or Not to Testify—Privilege from Testimony at the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals: The Randal Decision, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L LAW 511 (2003); Anastasia 
Heeger, Securing a Journalist’s Testimonial Privilege in the International Criminal 
Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 209 (2005). 
 187 Nina Kraut, A Critical Analysis of One Aspect of Randal in Light of International, 
European, and American Human Rights Conventions and Case Law, 35 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS L. REV. 337, 339 (2004). 
 188 See DENISE LEITH, BEARING WITNESS: THE LIVES OF WAR CORRESPONDENTS AND 
PHOTOJOURNALISTS (Random House 2004). 
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These issues arose for the first time in an international legal 
context in the Brdjanin and Talic case at the ICTY.189  This case 
highlighted the role of war correspondents as evidence gatherers in 
international criminal law, and the threat this poses to their 
work.190  Jonathan Randal, now a retired correspondent for the 
Washington Post had interviewed Brdjanin, one of the accused, 
with the assistance of an interpreter.  An article appeared in 1993.  
The article included several quotes attributed to the accused.  The 
prosecution sought to have the article admitted into evidence to 
help prove intent on the part of Brdjanin.  The defense objected, 
disputing the accuracy of the quotes and representations in the 
article, and requiring Randal to be called and cross-examined if the 
article were tendered.  The Trial Chamber refused to recognize “a 
testimonial privilege for journalists when no issue of protecting 
confidential sources was involved.”191  The subpoena was upheld 
and the article found to be admissible.192  This was appealed and 
an amicus brief was filed by a consortium of media companies and 
journalist associations.193 
Both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTY recognized 
the “vital role” conflict journalists “‘play . . . in bringing to the 
attention of the international community the horrors and realities of 
the conflict. . . .’”194  Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber took the 
view that due process was of greater importance than the 
protection of the media, especially as it discerned that the 
jurisprudence in human rights (which arguably pointed to a strong 
presumption to protect the media’s public function) was aimed 
more at cases where journalists were attempting to protect the 
confidentiality of their sources (and thus the relationship between 
reporter and source).195  The Trial Chamber felt that the test should 
be whether the evidence would be “‘pertinent’”196 to the case, a 
 
 189 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Case No. IT-99-36-AR3.9, 
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal (Dec. 11, 2002). 
 190 Id. § 2. 
 191 Id. § 5. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. § 7. 
 194 Id. § 8. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. § 9. 
JOYCE_STAFFPROOF_032507 4/2/2007  11:58:15 AM 
586 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. XVII 
low threshold.  Randal raised a number of arguments, including 
reliance on European human rights cases earlier discussed, such as 
Goodwin.197  He argued for a qualified testimonial privilege for 
war correspondents, and that any subpoena should only be issued 
as a last resort.198 
The Appeals Chamber, by contrast, took quite a vigorous 
position in protecting the role of war correspondents, discussing 
their role in the context of the international community’s right to 
receive “vital information from war zones . . .”199  The Appeals 
Chamber asserted that the news-gathering function of the media 
must be protected, that human rights jurisprudence and standards 
went further than the protection of confidential sources, but went 
to the heart of the media’s institutional role and capacity to 
function.200  The Chamber stated: “[w]hat really matters is the 
perception that war correspondents can be forced to become 
witnesses against their interviewees.”201  This again cuts to the 
heart of the relationship between reporter and source.  The 
dilemma was configured as a balancing exercise between the 
public interest in accommodating the work of conflict journalists 
and the public interest in the courts having all relevant evidence in 
such cases.202  The Appeals Chamber formulated a middle way test 
and sent the matter back to the Trial Chamber.  The two-pronged 
test, which has some continuity with the dissenting Justice 
Stewart’s three-pronged formulation in Branzburg, aims to 
minimize the need to call journalists in such cases (which so far 
appears to have been successful) and involves the following, 
“[f]irst, the petitioning party must demonstrate that the evidence 
sought is of direct and important value in determining a core issue 
in the case.  Second, it must demonstrate that the evidence sought 
cannot reasonably be obtained elsewhere.”203 
 
 197 Id. § 13. 
 198 Id. § 14. 
 199 Id. § 38. 
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 203 Id. § 50. 
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While some journalists have opted to give evidence in 
international criminal trials, they remain in the minority.  In 
general the media continue to claim this qualified privilege, and 
there have been arguments made for further reform of this area in 
the practice of the International Criminal Court and in the Rome 
Statute itself, to give certainty in what remains a rapidly 
developing field.204 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The case of Judith Miller is now both murkier and clearer than 
was first thought, and its precedential value also remains uncertain.  
The case does not conform to broader heroic narratives of the role 
of the journalist in American public life, yet its significance lies in 
highlighting the competing visions of the media’s power and role 
emerging in the post-Watergate era.  It reveals at one level the 
historical and political contexts which are crucial to the 
development of legal protections for the media and to related ideas 
about the First Amendment.  It also highlights the ways in which 
we are torn between what we want journalism to be and how we 
expect the courts to have a role in articulating this role for the 
media. 
On the one hand there is a vision of the media as a democratic 
watchdog that has emerged in traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence205 and which has been picked up in different legal 
contexts at the regional European level and in the work of 
international courts and tribunals, themselves increasingly faced 
with questions regarding media power, its benefits and its dangers.  
This comparative backdrop reveals different and competing visions 
 
 204 Anastasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist’s Testimonial Privilege in the International 
Criminal Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 209 (2005). 
 205 Note, however, that Kyu Ho Youm has recently argued provocatively that despite the 
successful U.S. export of the notion of the watchdog internationally, the U.S. courts 
themselves have in recent times refused to recognize institutional protections for the news 
media.  He writes that the watchdog and free flow of information concepts have been 
given “little more than perfunctory attention” in recent decisions regarding the privilege 
and even in the Branzburg case itself.  Kyu Ho Youm, International and Comparative 
Law on the Journalist’s Privilege: The Randal Case as a Lesson for the American Press, 
1 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 53–54 (2006). 
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emerging in international and local contexts for the role of the 
media in political life.206 
On the other hand there is a vision of the media as a threat to 
democracy and distorting influence on the democratic public 
sphere.  As so much of social and political life is mediated, we 
both desire and fear a powerful press and are confused as to the 
role it might play in our lives.  This has caused confusion in the 
courts and in the media, and has revealed at times a press not seen 
as living up to its lofty ideals, and a court system which both 
trumpets media freedom and free speech, yet is quick to quash 
such freedom when it threatens the administration of justice or 
national security. 
Miller reveals both the importance of the media in American 
life, but also a shift away from a heroic image of the press in recent 
times.  It also reveals the ambivalence now felt by many about the 
media, and the law’s toughening stance.  Ultimately we are caught 
between a vision of the media as watchdog and our suspicion that 
in certain cases the dog has jumped the fence and may now need 
watching itself.  Similar concerns are attached to public 
understandings of judicial power and it is no surprise that the 
courts have had difficulty with the role of watching the watchdogs. 
The cases discussed in this essay also reveal differences in 
approaches to the protection of sources depending upon the 
context, jurisdiction and specific facts.  The trend away from 
protection in the United States is particularly strong as regards 
criminal law cases involving grand juries such as Branzburg and 
Miller, or in a case like Gonzales with its national security 
implications.  However, the recent civil case of Lee appears to be 
following in this direction too.  Goodwin, by contrast was a civil 
case with facts that related to commercial confidence and did not 
involve a Judith Miller style scenario.  While finding a violation of 
Article 10, the European court did not object to the prior restraint 
of Goodwin’s article, a matter which tempers some of the gloss of 
Goodwin.  Perhaps different facts may have yielded a different 
result, though now the case’s broad protection for journalistic 
sources seems well entrenched in the European jurisprudence.  As 
 
 206 See id. 
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noted, this has not prevented continuing attempts to subpoena 
journalists.  Lastly, the international criminal case of Randal also 
saw the ICTY dealing with a less problematic set of facts than in 
Branzburg or Miller.  Different facts might have threatened the 
finding as to the privilege, especially if such facts involved say 
Randal having exculpatory evidence which he refused to divulge.  
As such it was relatively uncontroversial for the court to find a 
privilege and it limited such a privilege to the heroic ideal at its 
highest, the conflict journalist.207 
There is at present confusion in the cases in the United States 
federal context as competing visions of the media and of 
Branzburg’s legacy have emerged.  If the Supreme Court is to 
revisit Branzburg, it will need to consider closely the political and 
historical forces which underscore the competing visions of the 
journalist in American life.  In so doing the court will have to come 
to terms with our complex and often contradictory desires for and 
fears of media power and spectacle in a post-Watergate era.  It may 
also be useful to consider comparative approaches to the protection 
of journalistic sources at the European and international level. 
 
 207 I am grateful to Professor Richard N. Winfield for helping to clarify these 
distinctions. 
